In Cameron International Corp. v. Martinez, No. 21-0614, 2022 WL 17998214 (Dec. 30, 2022), the Texas Supreme Court rendered judgment in favor of Cameron International Corporation, an oilfield services company, in a vicarious liability case where Cameron potentially faced multimillion-dollar damages. Cameron has far-reaching implications for employers across Texas.
In its opinion, the Texas Supreme Court identified important limitations on the theory of vicarious liability based on an employee’s “special mission.” A “special mission,” the Court made clear, is a narrow concept that does not encompass a worker’s off-duty trip to buy personal supplies—even “necessities” like water or ice for working at a hot West Texas oil well.
Background
The Cameron case arose from an auto accident involving a worker at an oil-and-gas wellsite in West Texas. Cameron International had been hired to perform testing services at the wellsite; Cameron in turn hired contractors for the project. After finishing his shift, one of these contractors left the wellsite and drove to the nearest town to have dinner, refuel his truck, and replenish his personal supply of groceries in case a job at another well became available the next day. Driving back to the wellsite, where temporary housing was located, the contractor got into an auto accident with another vehicle; two people died and two were injured.
The injured parties and survivors of the deceased sued Cameron and other defendants in Texas state court, asserting various claims, including vicarious liability for the accident. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Cameron and the El Paso Court of Appeals affirmed as to all but one claim. On vicarious liability, the Court of Appeals reversed, noting (among other things) “fact issues” as to whether the contractor was on a “special mission” for Cameron while purchasing “necessities” like food, water, and gas for his truck. The Court also identified fact issues regarding the contractor’s status as an independent contractor or Cameron’s de-facto employee.
Texas Supreme Court’s ruling
The Texas Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals and rendered judgment in favor of Cameron. Applying the framework it established in Painter v. Amerimex Drilling I, Ltd., 561 S.W.3d 125 (Tex. 2018), the Supreme Court held that the contractor was not on a “special mission” while driving back to the wellsite after “completing personal errands.” The Court explained that special-mission vicarious liability requires more, such as proof that Cameron had “directed [the contractor]” to make the trip and that the contractor was purchasing supplies “for other workers or for the worksite generally,” not just for himself.
In reaching this conclusion, the Supreme Court agreed with Cameron that the Court of Appeals had applied an erroneously low legal standard that could “turn nearly any personal grocery errand into a special mission.” That lower standard drew on principles of workers’- compensation law, which the Supreme Court confirmed are separate from and inapplicable to the “course-and-scope” analysis for common-law vicarious liability.
Because the contractor was not in the “course-and-scope” of his alleged employment at the time of the accident, the Supreme Court rendered judgment that the plaintiffs take nothing from Cameron. (The Court did not reach the issue of employment status.)
The Texas Supreme Court’s ruling in Cameron represents an important clarification of the boundaries of employer vicarious liability based on “special missions.” Under the Court of Appeals’ ruling, workers in the oilfield—or on construction sites or road crews—might subject their employers to vicarious liability whenever they left the worksite to pick up basic “necessities” like food, water, or ice.
But the Texas Supreme Court rejected such an open-ended rule as “prov[ing] too much.” Under Cameron, employers will be better able to predict and plan for potential liability to third parties.
For further information, please contact Lucas Elliot or Thomas F. Allen, who represented Cameron International Corporation in the Texas Supreme Court.
